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N ORDER TO SERVE coordinated airports, an airline must
own take-off and landing rights (slots).' These rights allow an
airline to use the airport's runway capacities at a specific time on
a specific day.2 Take-off and landing rights are allocated by na-
tional authorities free of charge, but the demand for slots far
exceeds the supply.' Under certain circumstances, the airlines
therefore have a strong incentive to acquire slots by purchasing
them from other airlines. Such slot trading is allowed in the
United States and the United Kingdom.4 In the other member
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1 INT'L AIR TRANSP. ASS'N, WORLDWIDE SCHEDULING GUIDELINES 4 (12th ed.
2005).
2 See id. at 11.
3 TRANSP. RESEARCH CTR., TRANSP. SERVS.: THE LiMITS OF (DE)REGULATION 22
(2004); David Starkie, Allocating Airport Slots: a Role for the Market?, 4J. AIR TRANSP.
MGMT. 111, 111 (1998).
4 Starkie, supra note 3, at 112-13.
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states of the European Union slot trading is not officially legal-
ized yet, but is, on the other hand, not prosecuted anymore.5
If an airline wishes to purchase a slot, it must, first of all, de-
termine its value. In this context, the aim is not to calculate an
objective value at market equilibrium, as in the case of valuation
models in financial theory,6 but to determine the subjective
value in use (VIU) of the slot for the airline in question. Know-
ing the VIU of a slot is of considerable importance to an airline
because it enables it to establish the maximum price it could pay
for the slot without the transaction being disadvantageous. 7 The
greater extent to which the price of the slot is below its VIU, the
more advantageous the purchase of the take-off or landing right
for the airline. If, on the other hand, the price of the slot ex-
ceeds its VIU, the transaction is disadvantageous and should not
5 See Starkie, supra note 3, at 114. For a detailed analysis of slot trading in the
United States, see generally Sabine J. Langner, Contractual Aspects of Transacting in
Slots in the United States, 2J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 151 (1995); Starkie, supra note 3;
David Starkie, Developments in Transport Policy-The US Market in Airport Slots, 28 J.
TRANSP. ECON. & POL'Y 325, 325 (1994). On slot trading in the United Kingdom
and a discussion of the buying and selling of slots in the European Union, see
generally Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions on the Application of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 on Common
Rules for the Allocation of Slots at Community Airports, as amended COM
(2008) 227 final (Apr. 30, 2008); Matthias Kilian, The Development of the Regulatory
Regime of Slot Allocation in the EU, (2004) in AIRPORT SLOTS: INTERNATIONAL EXPER-
IENCES AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 252 (Achim I. Czerny et al. Eds., 2008) [herein-
after Slot Allocation]; CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SECONDARY SLOT TRADING (2001); CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY, INTRODUCING COM-
MERCIAL ALLOCATION MECHANISMS: THE UK CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY'S RE-
SPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S STAFF WORKING PAPER ON SLOT REFORM
(2004); Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Management of Airport Congestion Through Slot
Allocation, 6 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 29 (2000); Tom C. Bass, Infrastructure Con-
straints and theEC, 1J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 145 (1994); Matthias Kilian, Der Handel
mit Slots-Die Entscheidung des High Court im Verfahren Regina vs. Airport Co-Ordina-
tion Ltd., 23 TRANSPR 159 (2000) (F.R.G.).
6 See, e.g., TOM COPELAND, TIM KOLLER &JACK MURRIN, VALUATION: MEASURING
AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES (3d ed. 2000); John Stonier, Airline
Long-Term Planning Under Uncertainty: The Benefits of Asset Hexibility Created Through
Product Commonality and Manufacturer Lead Time Reductions, in REAL OPTIONS AND
BUSINESS STRATEGY 135 (Lenos Trigeorgis ed., 1999); Fischer Black & Merton
Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973);
John C. Cox, Stephen A. Ross, & Mark Rubinstein, Option Pricing: A Simplified
Approach, 7J. FIN. ECON. 229 (1979).
7 See Thomas Hering, Michael Olbrich & Martin Steinrficke, Valuation of Star-
tup Internet Companies, 33 INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 406-19 (2006); Manfred Jfirgen
Matschke, Der Gesamtwert der Unternehmung als Entscheidungswert, 24 BETRIEBSWIRT-
SCHAFTLICHE FORSCHUNG UND PRAXIS 146-61 (1972).
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be conducted. In light of the highly individualized market for
slot trading which is characterized by extensive excess de-
mand-i.e. the acquiring company is not just a price-taker-it is
particularly important to identify the subjective price limit be-
cause, in some cases, airlines have to spend up to several million
euros or U.S. dollars in order to buy a slot.' In other words, it is
a substantial investment, especially for small and medium-sized
companies. Consequently, maximum price determination does
not remain only an academic concern from the perspective of
valuation theory, but is also of practical interest to the respective
company in the mostly bilateral negotiation process.
The importance of appropriate slot valuation, especially to an
airline's capital budgeters, becomes apparent when taking a
look at recent balance sheets of firms in the airline industry. In
2007, for example, Continental Airlines acquired slots at
London's Heathrow Airport for a total amount of $116 million.9
Both in 2007 and 2008, the amounts invested in international
slots represented 26% of the company's total capital expendi-
ture, with the remainder consisting of the acquisition cost of
new aircraft and related support equipment.1 0 Identifying the
impact of slot valuation on periodical cash flows from the per-
spective of an airline as large as Continental Airlines indicates
that investment in take-off and landing slots is of even greater
relative importance to smaller airlines that intend to serve such
airports.
8 Current prices paid for slots at important international airports amount to
double-digit million euro/dollar sums. For example, it is reported that Alitalia
sold several slot bundles at London's Heathrow Airport in 2007 for a total of 92
million euros to competitors such as British Airways, Continental Airlines, and
US Airways. Kevin Done, Alitalia Sells Heathrow Slots, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2007,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/Oaea33le-b3aO-1ldc-a6df-0000779fd2ac.html. It is
furthermore reported that, among this total amount, over 30 million euros were
paid for one pair of take-off and landing rights. Id. Similarly, Continental Air-
lines acquired two pairs of take-off and landing rights for $116 million ($58 mil-
lion per bundle) at Heathrow Airport in 2007. Kevin Done, Continental Pays
Heathrow Record, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/
b6a47274-e955-1 1dc-8365-0000779fd2ac.html [hereinafter Continental Pays
Heathrow]. For an analysis of the prices paid for slots, see Severin Borenstein, The
Evolution of U.S. Airline Competition, 6J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 45 (1992); Slot Alloca-
tion, supra note 5.
9 Continental Pays Heathrow, supra note 8.
10 For further information, see Cont'l Airlines, Inc. Annual Report (Form 10-
K), at 49, 79 (Feb. 11, 2008); Cont'l Airlines, Inc. Annual Report (Form 10-K), at
55, 91 (Feb. 13, 2009). Similar amounts can be found in annual reports of other
airlines. See, e.g., BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC., 2007/08 ANNUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS 16,
101 (2008). See also DEUTSCHE LUFrHANSA AG, ANNUAL REPORT 2008 155 (2009).
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Although slot trading is widely discussed in literature, there is,
to date, no analysis of how to determine the subjective VIU of a
take-off or landing right. The present article aims to close this
gap by examining how an airline should proceed in order to
measure a slot's value. For this purpose, two valuation models
are presented in Section II, which are specified by examples of
calculations for specific valuation problems that occur in prac-
tice in Section III.
II. VALUATION MODELS
A. PRESENT VALUE TECHNIQUE
In Section I, reference was made constantly to the value of "a"
slot. However, a closer look at the situation reveals that one sin-
gle slot is generally useless to an airline because, in addition to a
take-off right at Airport A, it needs a landing right at Airport B.
Also, to enable the aircraft to fly back home, a take-off right at
Airport B and a landing right at Airport A are needed (or even
more slots, if the airline does not fly back directly from B to A
but, for example, from B via C back to A). That is, in order to
value slots, even for the most simple case, it is generally neces-
sary to consider a bundle of at least four slots (Airport A: take-
off and landing, Airport B: landing and take-off), and to mea-
sure the VIU, not of one single slot, but of this bundle of slots. 1
In this context, the earnings (net cash flows) CF, that the airline
will gain through the bundle of slots in future periods t are dis-
counted to the present day. 2 These net cash flows derive from
the periodical turnover T earned from passenger and freight
transport, the expenses associated with the use of the aircraft EP,
(for example, fuel and personnel costs) and airport-related ex-
penses EA, (such as airport charges and gate leases):
(1) CF, = Tt- EPr- EAt.
Characteristic of the valuation of slots is the fact that the life-
time of this asset is generally unlimited. As long as the airline
uses the take-off and landing capacity of a slot at least to an ex-
tent of 80% during a flight period, the take-off and landing
right does not expire ("use it or lose it rule"). Therefore, in the
11 See Hans-Jfirgen Ewers et al., M6glichkeiten der besseren Nutzung von Zeitnischen
aufFlughdfen (Slots), in DEUTSCHLAND UND DER EU 15 (2001) (unpublished work-
ing paper, on file with Technische Universitdt Berlin).
12 See GUNTER JAENSCH, WERT UND PREIS DER GANZEN UNTERNEHMUNG 23-33
(1966).
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event that the airline does not plan to sell the slot in the future,
the valuation time horizon is indefinite and hence differs from
those of other capital expenditures. However, if the airline does
not plan to use the take-off and landing rights itself, but to lease
them to another company for certain periods (which is possible
in the United States), the periodic net cash flows are the earn-
ings gained from the leasing contract L,:
(2) CFt = Lt.
If the airline aims to sell the bundle of slots at the end of its
periods of usage to another company, the surplus of the last pe-
riod t = n is obtained from the earnings according to Equation
(1) plus the net turnover NT that will be realized by selling the
slots at the end of period n:
(3) CFn = T, - EPn - EA, + NT,.
With discount rate i, periods of usage t E {1, . , n} and exclu-
sive use by the airline itself (that is, no lease), the VIU of the slot
bundle is calculated by:
(), T, - EP, - EA, NT.(4) VRU=Z +-
t=, (1+ i)' (l+ i)'
With the use of equations (1) and (3), this can be formulated
more simply as:
(5) VlU Y CF,
t=U (1 + i)t
The discount rate i that is used in this context for calculating
the present value is the internal rate of return (IRR) of the best
alternative investment that the airline could make with the
money needed to purchase the slot bundle, for example the
purchase of another aircraft or the redemption of a credit.'3
Consequently, not only the forecast of future cash flows gener-
ated by the slot bundle, but also the determination of the rele-
vant discount rate has to be carried out from a strict subjective
perspective. This constitutes the central characteristic of the
models presented in this article. Unlike this approach, valua-
tion models in financial theory are typically based on the market
equilibrium assumption in order to determine investment alter-
natives, capital structure, risk disposition, and, hence, the dis-
count rate. When applying these models, the actual investment
and financing alternatives of the specific airline are not taken
13 See THOMAS HERING, INVESTIT1ONSTHEORIE (2d ed. 2003).
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into account. In consequence, values that are calculated based
on financial theory typically do not represent subjective maxi-
mum prices.
When the VIU of the slot bundle has been determined in the
manner shown above, the airline gains information about the
maximum price it can pay for the four slots together, without
the transaction being disadvantageous. That is, the sum of the
prices Ps that the airline pays for the four slots (S E {1, 2, 3, 4})
must not exceed the VIU of the slot bundle: 4
4
(6) ZP < V1u.
S=I
The calculation of the maximum price can be demonstrated
by means of the following simple example:
An airline considers the acquisition of a take-off and landing
right at Airport A and a take-off and landing right at Airport B.
The company forecasts that flying between A and B will lead to
periodic net cash flows of three million euros that remain con-
stant over the future periods one to three. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we assume just three future periods of slot usage. The
company knows that the return on its best alternative invest-
ment is 4%. The VIU of the slot bundle at Airports A and B is
then calculated as:
' 3 million euros
t=1 (1.04) t
= 8.33 million euros.
The sum of the prices P, of the slot bundle at Airports A and B
must not exceed 8.33 million euros.
If the airline knows the IRR of the best alternative investment,
the present value method is preferred to linear programming
(presented in Section II. B.) because no further assumptions re-
lating to the application of linear programming need to be spec-
ified. Thus, valuation complexity is reduced if the present value
14 Once the VIU is determined using the present value technique, it can also
easily be applied to the decision to sell a bundle of slots. For this purpose, the
VIU characterizes the minimum price for which the airline should sell the slot
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method can be applied. However, in reality, an airline fre-
quently does not know the best alternative investment compared
to the purchase of slots because, due to its size or group struc-
ture, it has a complex program of financing and investment op-
tions. If the airline lacks information on the best alternative
investment, it also does not know the IRR of this investment.
This is when linear programming can be applied.
B. LINEAR PROGRAMMING
In a situation in which the present value technique cannot be
used because the airline does not know the IRR of the best alter-
native investment, valuation must be based on a model that is
not dependent on this information. The ZGPM (Zustands-
Grenzpreismodell, state marginal price model) is just such a
model. 15 It determines the VIU of a bundle of slots with the aid
of linear programming. 16 Linear programming enables the air-
line to determine the maximum price of the slot bundle based
on the company's actual investment and financing alternatives
without the need to discount future cash flows. Rather, the
model computes the maximum amount that can be invested
with the airline reaching the identical wealth level that is
achieved if the acquisition is not conducted.
For the airline, the following assumptions are made. Its plan-
ning period extends over n possible future states. In the base-
line situation (present state t = 0), there are m investment or
financing objects which the airline may choose individually or
combine. Each object j is characterized by the state-contingent
cash stream g- = (go, g1,, . •., g, . . ., g,) with gj being the cash
flow of object j in state t. The decision variable xj indicates how
often the object (investment/financing alternative) j is under-
taken. For the variables x, there may be upper bounds xj"
(which can also be o). Moreover, for every state t, there is an
autonomous cash flow b1, that can be negative, zero, or positive,
15 See Thomas Hering, Das allgemeine Zustands-Grenzpreismodell zur Bewertung von
Unternehmen und anderen unsicheren Zahlungsstr6men, 60 DIE BETRIEBSWIRTSCHArL-
362 (2000).
16 See id.; see also JAENSCH, supra note 12, at 664-65; Hans M. Weingartner,
Mathematical Programming and the Analysis of Capital Budgeting Problems (1963);
Herbert Hax, Investitions-und Finanzplanung mit Hilfe der Linearen Program-
mierung, 16 SCHMALENBACHS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTrLICHE FOR-
SCHUNG 430 (1964); Helmut Laux & Gfinter Franke, Zum Problem der Bewertung
von Unternehmungen und anderen Investitionsgutern, 13 UNTERNEHMENSFORSCHUNG
205 (1969); Matschke, supra note 7.
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and that is in no way dependent on the objects to be assessed.'
If the airline pursues the goal of maximizing its wealth, it will
strive for the greatest possible sum asset value (AV) of weighted
withdrawals, where the cash flow G, in state t enters into the ob-
jective function with weight w. The n+1 liquidity constraints en-
sure that in each state t, the sum of all cash flows remains
positive or zero. The variables G, and xj are also limited to posi-
tive values or zero. All in all, the "baseline program" (the com-
bination of financing and investment options that maximizes
the airline's success without the purchase of the slot bundle in
question) is derived from the following linear optimization
approach:
n
max. AV; AV: = w t Gt
t-0
m
-E--git. xi+G t  <bt VtE={f0,1,..n}
j=1
x X max VjE{1,2,...,m}
Gt~xi 0 Vt and j
The simplex algorithm allows an easy calculation of the baseline
program resulting in an optimal AV*. Then, buying the bundle
of slots at a price p is only economically viable if it at least yields
the optimal AV* of the baseline program.
If the airline buys the bundle of slots, it thus receives its state-
contingent cash stream gK = (0, gKl, gK2, .. ., gK, . ., gK) and pays
(in t = 0) the price p. The VIU must then be found, that is, the
maximum price p that the airline can just afford to pay, without
the slot acquisition putting the company in a worse position
than if, instead, it had implemented the available baseline pro-
gram. In this manner, p must consequently be maximized, tak-
ing into account the restrictions of the original decision
environment, extended by the cash stream from using the ac-
quired bundle of slots and subject to the additional condition of
not violating AV*. The "valuation program" (the combination
of financing and investment options that includes the acquired
slot bundle in question) is calculated by the following linear op-
timization approach:
17 The cash flow b, is thus obtained from established and regular payments
such as salaries, ongoing revenues, or debt servicing.
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max. VIU; VIU:= p
m
-g 0 "xi+G 0 +p <b
j=1
m





x maxx  VjE{1,2,...,m}
Gt,p,xi >0 Vt and j
Again, the simplex algorithm generates the optimal solution
and thus provides not only the maximum price p* (that is, the
VIU), but also the airline's optimal investment and financing
program, restructured through including earnings from the slot
bundle in exchange for the acquisition price p*.
The manner in which the VIU of a bundle of slots can be
calculated by the ZGPM is demonstrated below by means of an
example, in which we consider four future states that are inter-
preted as annual points in time. In order to reduce the com-
plexity of the example we assume, in addition to this short
planning horizon of four years, that the airline has only a few
investment and finance options. First, the airline can invest in a
tangible asset T (for example, an acquisition of another aircraft)
which is associated with the payment stream (-80, 40, 40, 40) (in
million euros). Second, the airline is able to invest money in
financial assets F that promise a return of 5% per annum. Fur-
thermore, the airline can borrow money Mat an interest rate of
10% per annum. The airline's business generates annual auton-
omous cash flows b, amounting to thirty million euros. The ob-
jective is to compute the VIU, which is the maximum price p*
the airline could pay for the bundle of four slots. Table 1 gives
an overview of the data relating to this example.
906 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Table 1. Data used in the example
Year t T M0  M, M2 F0  F, F2 b,
(Tangible (Finance (") (") (Financial (") (") (Autonomous
asset in cash asset) cash flow in
million flows) million
euros) euros)
0 -80 1 -1 30
1 40 -1.1 1 1.05 -1 30
2 40 -1.1 1 1.05 -1 30
3 40 -1.1 1.05 30
Limit 1 0 . ... .
In the baseline program, the airline proceeds with the tangi-
ble asset investment (acquisition of another aircraft), which is,
in the first year, financed partly by means of a loan. The sur-
pluses gained in the succeeding years are-after repaying the
loan-invested in financial assets. At the end of the third year,
the airline achieves an asset value of 160.0375 million euros. In
Table 2, the described baseline program is shown with all cash
streams that occur during the four years.
Table 2. Baseline program
Year t= 0 t= 1 t=2 t= 3
Tangible asset T -80 40 40 40
Autonomous cash flow b, 30 30 30 30
Loan L 50 -55
Financial asset F, -15 15.75
Financial asset F2  -85.75 90.0375
Asset value 160.0375
With regard to the valuation program, this means that the air-
line must also be able to gain an asset value at the end of the
third year of at least 160.0375 million euros after the acquisition
of the slot bundle. The maximum price p* that can be paid
under these conditions is calculated by the following linear op-
timization approach. In this context, the airline forecasts cash
inflows by using the slot bundle with an amount of 4 million
euros in t = 1, 3 million euros in t = 2, and 2 million euros in t =
THE VALUATION OF AIRPORT SLOTS
max. VIU; VIU: = p
80 T + FO- LO + p < 30
-40 T - 1.05 F0 + 1.1 L0 + F1 - L 30+4
-40 T - 1.05 F, + 1.1 L1 + F 2 - L 2  30+ 3
G3 - 40 T - 1.05 F 2 + 1.1 L 2  < 30+ 2
T < 1
G3  > 160.0375
G3, T, F0, F1, F 2 , L0, L1, L2, p > 0
The maximum price that can be paid for the bundle of four
slots is p* = 7.8829 million euros. The valuation program in-
cludes the tangible asset investment, bundle of four slots, loan
in the first and second years, and financial asset investment in
the third year. In Table 3, the described valuation program is
shown with all cash streams that occur during the four years.
Table 3. Valuation program
Year t=0 t= 1 t=2 t= 3
Tangible asset T -80 40 40 40
Autonomous cash flow b, + 30 34 33 32
slot cash flow gK,
Price p* -7.8829
Loan L0  57.8829 -63.6712
Financial asset F, -10.3288 10.8453
Financial asset F2  -83.8453 88.0375
Asset value 160.0375
As shown in the example, the simplex algorithm not only deter-
mines the maximum price the airline can pay for the slot bun-
dle, which is necessary in order to prevent a disadvantageous
investment, but additionally provides the airline's optimal in-
vestment and financing program, including cash flows from the
slot bundle and the acquisition price p*.
Consequently, in cases when the airline does not know the
IRR of the best alternative investment, linear programming can
deliver the relevant maximum price. Applying linear program-
ming requires first determining the maximum success repre-
sented by the maximum asset value of the airlines' combination
of financing and investment options without considering the
purchase of the slot bundle. Therefore, the airline has to iden-
tify current investment and finance options, and by solving a
simplex algorithm, calculate the attainable value at the end of
the investment period. Second, the airline must determine the
maximum price payable in state t = 0 by solving the second sim-
9072009]
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plex algorithm, taking into account the additional cash flow
stream generated by the slot bundle.
Although linear programming was only shown for the
purchase decision, it can likewise be applied to the decision to
sell the slot bundle. For this purpose, the airline has to deter-
mine the optimum value AV* of its baseline program as the first
step, including the cash flow stream generated by the slot bun-
dle.'1 Second, the valuation program must be slightly modified:
since the airline now considers selling the slot bundle, the valua-
tion model has to derive the minimum price V that allows the
airline to retain the optimum AV*, taking into account that the
cash flow stream generated by the slot bundle is no longer con-
sidered. Consequently, the valuation program can be calculated
by the following linear optimization program: 9
min. V; V:= p




-Egjt "Xj--G t b t -gKt V t G 11,2,...,n}I
j=1
n
-ywt.G t  <-AV*
t=0
x xax Vj {1,2,...,m}
Gp x __ 0 Vt and j
III. VALUATION IN PRACTICE
A. SUBJECTIVE DECISION FIELDS
As the core concern of this article, the determination of the
VIU is based on the subjective investment and financing alterna-
tives the individual has at the moment of valuation. Unlike this
subjective perspective, discounted cash flow models 20 in finan-
cial theory are based on approaches such as the Capital Asset
18 Applying the same numerical example to the disposal situation with the in-
vestment in asset , the autonomous cash flow b, + the slot cash flow gK, reveals an
optimum AV* = 169.5975 million euros.
19 The continuation of the numerical example for the sale of the slots delivers
the minimum price p* = 7.8829 million euros.
20 With respect to discounted cash flow models, see generally COPELAND et al.,
supra note 6, at 62-67.
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Pricing Model (CAPM),21 which relies on certain premises that
are necessary for determining objective market values in market
equilibrium. As an example, Deutsche Lufthansa AG applies
the cash value-added concept as its companywide value-based
management measure. 22 In this model, a certain capital expen-
diture generates additional value if cash flows exceed the cost of
capital applied. Cost of capital applied represents the return on
investment expected by investors and is determined using the
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) which is calculated
based on the assumptions of the CAPM. Critical assumptions of
the CAPM include, for example, identical information of mar-
ket participants and, accordingly, homogeneous expectations.
Consequently, all investors hold identical portfolios of risky as-
sets (that is, the market portfolio). Additionally, derived market
prices are based on the presumed possibility of borrowing and
investing money at a constant interest rate that is available to
any investor in the market.
In contrast, it is necessary to take into account the real alter-
native investment and financing decisions of the subject con-
ducting the valuation (that is, the subjective portfolio), so as to
derive values that are relevant to decisions. This is why, in short,
the VIU can also be referred to as the decision value. Thus, in
principle, there are no limitations with respect to the number of
possible realizations since they are specific to the respective indi-
vidual. Hence, for the purpose of valuing take-off and landing
rights, the airline's alternatives-the subjective decision field-
could be represented by, for example, the redemption of a
credit, the investment in slots at another airport, and the lease
of aircrafts to competitors, but also any other investment or fi-
nancing project the airline is able to undertake. These alterna-
tives have an effect on both the cash flows generated by the
usage of the slots (for example, tangible asset investment T in
the linear programming example shown above) and on the rele-
vant discount rate that is applied in the present value technique.
21 For specifications regarding the CAPM, see John Lintner, The Valuation of
Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets,
47 REv. OF ECON. & STATS. 13 (1965); Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7J. FIN.
77 (1952);Jan Mossin, Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market, 34 ECONOMETRiCA 768
(1966); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under
Conditions of Risk, 19J. FIN. 425, 427, 433-34 (1964).
22 See DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AG, supra note 10, at 39.
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B. BUNDLE PROBLEM
As mentioned in Section II. A., the VIU must generally be cal-
culated not for a single slot, but for a bundle of at least four
slots. This may constitute a problem because the valuation com-
putes the price limit for the four slots together. Yet, it is fre-
quently the case that four slots cannot be purchased in one
transaction. In other words, the airline has the challenging situ-
ation of negotiating more than one slot transaction. For exam-
ple, the airline may be engaged in two negotiations (first, buying
a take-off and a landing right at Airport A, and second, buying a
landing and a take-off right at Airport B), for which the sum of
the two individual price negotiations must not exceed the VIU
of the bundle of four slots. In many cases, it will not be possible
for the airline to conduct parallel negotiations, such that succes-
sive acquisitions of the four slots are often the only practical so-
lution. In these situations, the airline bears the risk of being
able to buy part of the slot bundle in the first negotiation but
not the entire bundle because the price limit for the bundle is
exceeded in the second negotiation. However, in such a case,
there are two ways out of the dilemma, either by buying other
slots as a substitute (for example, landing and take-off rights at
Airport C) or reselling those parts of the slot bundle that have
already been purchased.
Apart from the situation in which at least four slots are valued
altogether, constellations may also be found where a VIU must
be calculated for less than four slots. This can occur, for exam-
ple, if an airline in the European Union receives take-off and
landing rights in Stockholm and landing and take-off rights in
Frankfurt from the national authorities, but wishes to buy take-
off and landing rights at London Heathrow for flying Heathrow-
Frankfurt instead of Stockholm-Frankfurt. In order to deter-
mine the VIU of the two Heathrow slots that the airline plans to
buy, only the cash flow changes that occur through the slot ac-
quisition, in comparison to the initial constellation, must then
be taken into account. Section III. D. 1. presents an exemplary
specification of this practical valuation task.
C. PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY
In addition to considering the subjective alternatives at a
given point in time for the determination of decision-relevant
values, the airline undertakes the difficult task of estimating the
elements needed to calculate the slot value. These include, for
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example, the turnover earned from passenger and freight trans-
port, expenses associated with aircraft and airports, and the dis-
count rate. All of these quantities will occur in the future, that
is, they are uncertain and must therefore be forecasted. This
uncertainty cannot be eliminated, but it is useful to integrate
the likely effects visibly into the slot value. A risk analysis based
on a Monte Carlo simulation 21 is a particularly suitable instru-
ment for this purpose. It computes the statistical distribution of
the VIU, based on the assumed distributions of the elements
used for the valuation. In order to conduct the risk analysis, the
airline must perform three steps. First, it must estimate the pos-
sible range of magnitudes of each element entering into the val-
uation (turnover, expenses, discount rate) and the probability
of each magnitude occurring. Second, for each uncertain ele-
ment, a particular amount is selected at random from the distri-
butions assumed in step one, and the value of the slot bundle is
calculated using these selected amounts. This selection of mag-
nitudes is repeated several times with the aid of a computer, and
the value calculated on the basis of each selection is saved. If
this process is repeated often enough, the frequency distribu-
tion of the VIU evolves from these calculations. After this fre-
quency distribution has been determined, the interpretation of
the results follows as step three. In addition to the calculation of
means and medians, it is particularly useful to transform the re-
sults into diagrams, for example into a histogram or a risk pro-
file. The results of the risk analysis are of considerable
significance to the airline because they show the complete range
of possible outcomes of the VIU of the slot bundle and their
respective probabilities. It is the airline's individual decision as
to how to apply these results to identify a certain VIU, that is, to
set a specific price limit for the slot bundle. For example, a risk-
neutral airline will choose the mean VIU as the price limit, but
an airline that prefers to take certain risks will choose a price
limit that exceeds the mean. The application of a Monte Carlo
simulation in practice will be shown in Section III.D.2.
23 See generally David B. Hertz, Risk Analysis in Capital Investment, 42 HARV. Bus.
REV. 95 (1964); William Gibson & Peter Morrell, Theory and Practice in Aircraft
Financial Evaluation, 10 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 427 (2004).
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D. EXEMPLARY SLOT VALUE DETERMINATION
1. The Consideration of Real Alternatives
For the purpose of presenting some of the valuation situations
that arise in practice, it is appropriate to refer again to the ex-
ample introduced in Section II.A. as our base case: we consider
an airline that owns a take-off and a landing right at Airport A
and a landing and a take-off right at Airport B. The company
forecasts that flying between A and B will lead to periodic net
cash flows of three million euros that remain constant over the
future periods one to three (for the sake of simplicity, we as-
sume just three future periods of slot usage). As shown in Sec-
tion II.A., the maximum price the airline should be willing to
pay, considering the IRR of its best alternative investment of 4%,
amounts to 8.33 million euros.
As a variation of the airline's realizable investment portfolio at
a given moment, let us now assume that immediately (that is,
one logical second) after the acquisition of the slot bundle for
serving the route A to B (in the analysis below, it is assumed that
the airline had to pay its maximum subjective acquisition price
of 8.33 million euros at locations A and B, so that the transac-
tion is neither advantageous nor disadvantageous, but is, never-
theless, conducted), the airline has the chance to acquire a take-
off and landing right at Airport C. The airline now considers
whether it is financially advantageous to include destination C
in its route network.
In a situation like this, the airline can-in addition to main-
taining the status quo (that is, serving the route A to B)-choose
among the following two investment strategies. First, the airline
could consider whether it is advantageous to include Airport C
as an additional destination in its flight plan with the conse-
quence that Airport C could be approached from either Airport
A or B (Alternative (a)). Second, the airline could consider
whether it could also be beneficial to acquire the slots at Airport
C, while at the same time selling the already acquired take-off
and landing rights at, for example, Airport B (Alternative (b)).
Hence, slots at Airport C would represent a substitute for the
rights at Airport B. The appraisal of the two investment alterna-
tives are carried out separately below:
Regarding Alternative (a)--the assessment of the strategy to in-
clude Airport C as an additional location in the flight plan-the
airline forecasts constant periodic net cash flows of 5 million eu-
ros over the periods one to three. That is, adding Airport C to
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the route network leads to a rise in the cash flow per period
ACFt of two million euros. Because the airline knows that the
IRR of its best alternative investment is 4%, the VIU of the bun-
dle of landing and take-off rights at Airport C is calculated as:
(7) VU =- ACF.
t=1 (1I+ i)t
Entering the data from the example, it follows:
3 2 million euros
t= (1.04)t
= 5.55 million euros.
That is, for the two slots at Airport C, the airline can afford to
pay a maximum price of 5.55 million euros. If it paid more, the
acquisition of the slots at Airport C as an additional destination
would be disadvantageous, and the transaction should not be
executed.
In order to illustrate the decision process, it is furthermore
assumed that the airline can acquire the take-off and landing
right at Airport C for four million euros. Consequently, since
the actual acquisition price is lower than the subjective maxi-
mum price of 5.55 million euros, the acquisition and additional
operation to Airport C is beneficial to the airline (it is assumed
that the airline has four million euros available in liquid funds
which would be invested and yield 4% if the acquisition does not
take place). Thus, after the airline has also acquired the slots at
Airport C, its flight operations between A, B, and C generate
periodic net cash flows of 5.0 million euros with a VIU of 13.88
million euros, while the total acquisition price amounts to 12.33
million euros. Hence, Alternative (a) yields an IRR of 10.50%. An
overview of the investment characteristics with respect to Alterna-
live (a) is shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Investment overview Alternative (a)
Year t=0 t=I t=2 t=3
IRR of best alternative investment 4.00%
Acquisition of slots at Airports A and B -8.33
Acquisition of slots at Airport C -4.00
Slot cash flows 5.00 5.00 5.00
Value in use (discount rate 4.00%) 13.88
Total acquisition price 12.33
IRR Alternative (a) 10.50%
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With respect to Alternative (b)-the valuation of the acquisi-
tion of the slots at Airport C while selling the slots at Airport B-
it is assumed that the switch of Airports from B to C leads to a
rise in the net cash flow per period of 0.5 million euros over the
periods one to three. Additionally, because the airline can fi-
nance the acquisition of the slots at Destination C from its liquid
funds, it can reinvest the money that is received from the dispo-
sal of the slots at Airport B in a financial asset yielding the origi-
nal best rate of 4%. For quantification reasons it is then
assumed that, besides the acquisition of the slots at Destination
C amounting to four million euros, the slots at Airport B can be
sold for 2.5 million euros. Consequently, the reinvestment of
2.5 million euros yields periodic interest payments of 0.1 million
euros and the redemption of 2.5 million euros in t = 3.
Since the IRR of Alternative (a) of 10.50% exceeds the IRR of
the best alternative investment of 4% at the starting point of the
example, it is the new benchmark for assessing whether Alterna-
tive (b) is preferred to Alternative (a). Applying the rate of
10.50% in order to determine the subjective VIU of Alternative
(b) reveals a value of 10.73 million euros. Given that the acquisi-
tion of the slots at Airport C requires the investment of 4.0 mil-
lion euros and the initial investment in the slots at Airports A
and B of 8.33 million euros,2 4 Alternative (b) is not beneficial
compared to the realization of Alternative (a) since the invested
amount exceeds the airline's VIU. Table 5 summarizes the re-
sults of the appraisal of Alternative (b):
Table 5. Investment overview Alternative (b)
Year t = 0 t = 1 t - 2 t = 3
IRR of best alternative investment 10.50%
Acquisition of slots at Airports A and B -8.33
Acquisition of slots at Airport C -4.0
Disposal of slots at Airport B 2.5
Slot cash flows 3.5 3.5 3.5
Cash flows from reinvestment -2.5 0.1 0.1 2.6
Value in use (discount rate 10.50%) 10.73
Total amount invested 12.33
IRR Alternative (b) 3.54%
The example presented above underlines the critical impor-
tance of considering the valuation subject's individual invest-
24 Because the proceeds from the disposal of the slots at Airport B are rein-
vested, the total amount invested remains at a constant level of 12.33 million
euros.
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ment and financing options at a given point in time. If it is the
intention to determine subjective maximum (purchase deci-
sion) or minimum (disposal decision) prices that prevent disad-
vantageous situations, any change in the range of an individual's
possible investment and financing realizations affecting both
cash-flow streams and the discount rate must be taken into
account.
2. The Consideration of Uncertainty
In the following analysis, the valuation of slots using risk anal-
ysis is shown for the example already presented in Section
III.D.I., which has been modified slightly for this purpose:
We still assume that an airline knows the IRR of its best alter-
native investment, which is 4%. It is further assumed that this
rate is constant over time and is also certain. With respect to the
future cash flows that can be earned from the slot bundle, the
airline forecasts, based on market research and existing freight
transport contracts, a certain surplus of three million euros in t
= 1. Due to the difficulty of predicting future market develop-
ments, the earnings in the following periods are uncertain, so
that the airline forecasts earnings for the periods t = 2, t = 3, and
t = 4 to -, are subject to a normal distribution with the expected
values (3.25, 3.50, 3.75) (in million euros) and the standard de-
viations (0.25, 0.50, 0.75). From ten thousand calculation
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Table 6: Histogram of VIU
The mean VIU amounts to 92.3 million euros. A presentation
of the risk-analysis results equivalent to the histogram yields the
2009] 915
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
risk profile shown in the following table. It demonstrates the
likelihood of the VIU exceeding a certain level on the abscissa.
For example, the likelihood is 56.06% that the value of the slots
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Table 7: Risk profile of VIU
As explained above, it depends on the airline's individual risk
preference whether it chooses a maximum price in the acquisi-
tion process below the mean value of 92.3 million euros (risk
averse), a maximum price that is equal to the mean value (risk
neutral), or an amount exceeding the mean value (risk
friendly).
IV. SUMMARY
Airlines that intend to buy take-off or landing rights, as is pos-
sible in the United States and United Kingdom, must, first of all,
determine a value for these slots. The aim is not to calculate an
objective market value, but to identify the subjective VIU that
the slots have for the airline in question. The VIU indicates the
maximum price the airline can spend on the slots without the
transaction being disadvantageous. In order to compute this
price limit, a simple present value technique can be used if the
airline knows both its best alternative investment compared to
the slot acquisition and the IRR of this investment. The latter is
used as the discount rate in the present value technique. If the
airline does not know the best alternative investment because of
its very complex investment and financing portfolio, the slot val-
uation can be based on linear programming, that is, the ZGPM.
Two problems occur within the context of the valuation. First,
the bundle problem results from the fact that the value can gen-
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erally be calculated only for a bundle of at least four slots, but
purchasing these slots is often possible only in several individual
transactions. The sum of the prices negotiated in these individ-
ual transactions must not exceed the VIU, which takes into ac-
count the airline's alternative investment and financing
projects. Furthermore, there is the problem of uncertainty, be-
cause the valuation must always be based on magnitudes that are
obtained in the future. This uncertainty cannot be eliminated,
but its effects on the slot value can be identified with the help of
a Monte Carlo simulation.
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